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Abstract
We question whether the impact of constitutions on economic outcomes (Persson and
Tabellini, 2004) is direct. We show that voter turnout is a channel through which forms of
government a⁄ect economic policies. We provide evidence of the existence of two relation-
ships: the ￿rst links constitutions to voter turnout; the second connects voter turnout to
policy outcomes. Presidential regimes are found to induce less voter participation in national
elections. We then analyze the impact of constitutional variables and voter participation in
shaping ￿scal policies. Forms of governments lose their explanatory power once participation
is accounted for. Higher participation induces an increase in government expenditure, total
revenues and welfare state spending. We conclude that forms of government a⁄ect policy
outcomes through electoral participation.
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11 Introduction
The impact of political institutions on policy outcomes has gained much attention in the litera-
ture over the last years. Theoretical research has shown how forms of government and electoral
rules shape ￿scal policies. Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000), and
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) analyze the impact of a majoritarian rule versus a
proportional one in a⁄ecting government expenditure. Majoritarian rules, which mainly focus on
voters in marginal electoral districts, are found to produce smaller government expenditure and
more targeted programs1. Similarly, presidential regimes are found to induce less public good
provision. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) classify the form of government on the basis of
the presence of a vote of con￿dence. Parliamentary regimes are found to be characterized by
larger government expenditure. The vote of con￿dence for the executive power leads to legislative
cohesion in parliamentary regimes. This ultimately induces a broader and more generous public
good provision.
Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) empirically examine the economic impact of constitutions on
a large set of democracies. They ￿nd that political institutions have a signi￿cant impact on policy
outcomes. In particular, a majoritarian electoral rule induces smaller government spending and
smaller welfare programs relatively to a proportional rule. On the other hand, presidential regimes
prompts smaller public good provision than parliamentary regimes. Taking the work of Persson
and Tabellini (2003, 2004) as our starting point, we question whether the impact of constitutions
on economic outcomes is direct. We provide evidence that institutions shape voter participation
at general elections and that voter turnout ultimately a⁄ects economic outcomes. The novelty
of this work stands in the introduction of citizens￿political participation, rather than politicians￿
incentives, as the driving force connecting institutions to policy outcomes. We show that the way
forms of government in￿ uence policies is mediated by voter participation. More speci￿cally, we
provide evidence that presidential regimes have a negative impact on electoral participation. On
the other hand, voter turnout positively and signi￿cantly a⁄ects total government expenditure,
welfare state and budget surplus.
We provide evidence that voter turnout is a channel through which forms of government a⁄ect
economic policies. We demonstrate the existence of two relationships, the ￿rst connecting political
institutions to voter turnout and the second linking voter turnout to economic policies.
From an empirical point of view, the ￿rst link has been widely studied with regards to the
e⁄ects of the electoral rule on turnout decisions. Among others, Blais (2000) shows that turnout
is higher in proportional systems. Proportional rules are usually associated with a larger number
of parties, more competitive elections and are perceived as fairer by voters.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study of the e⁄ects of political regimes on turnout.
The only exception is the work by Powell (1982). He ￿nds lower turnout rates in countries with a
presidential regime and a majoritarian system; the author suggests this might be due to a weaker
party system and less mobilizing voting laws.
We empirically show that forms of government do signi￿cantly a⁄ect turnout rates. Presidential
regimes induce less participation relative to parliamentary systems. This result is robust even when
we relax the conditional mean independence and we instrument government regimes.
1In a recent paper, Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2008) test the e⁄ect of the electoral rule on politi-
cians￿behavior using Italian micro data. The authors show that, in line with the theory, politicians elected through
a majoritarian rule are more likely to put forward targeted and narrow programs than proportional representatives.
2Regarding the second relationship between voter turnout and policy outcomes, many studies
have analyzed related topics. Husted and Kenny (1997) ￿nd that the abolition of poll taxes
and literacy tests in the US had a positive impact on welfare state. Further, as the franchise
was extended to individuals from the lower part of the income distribution, government spending
increased in Europe, as shown by Aidt, Dutta, and Loukoianova (2005). A similar argument
might be applied to voter participation in presence of universal franchise. Among others, Blais
(2000) and Wol￿nger and Rosenstone (1980) show that the median income of electors is higher
than the median income of the actual voting age population. Lijphart (1997) assesses that such
a bias in voter representation might eventually lead to a bias in policy choices. In line with this
reasoning, Mueller and Stratmann (2003) analyze the e⁄ects of turnout rate on policy outcomes.
Voter participation is found to have a negative e⁄ect on income inequality and a positive impact
on the size of government.
Unlike Mueller and Stratmann, however, we focus on the relationship between electoral par-
ticipation and form of government in in￿ uencing a number of economic variables such as total
government, revenues, welfare state and budget surplus. The instrumental variable analysis shows
that higher turnout rates are associated to larger government spending, higher government rev-
enues and more generous welfare states.
We conclude that forms of government a⁄ect electors￿behavior in terms of turnout at elections.
This in turn has an impact on economic policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes Persson and Tabellini￿ s
results and explains how this comment extends their analysis. In sections 3 to 6, we empirically
investigate the interaction of voter turnout with constitutional variables and its role in explaining
￿scal policies. Finally, in section 7 we summarize our results and conclude the paper.
2 Data
We use two main data sources. The ￿rst data source is the cross-country data set used by Persson
and Tabellini (2004). The data set contains information on 85 countries classi￿ed as democracies
in the 1990s. Observation units are average values over the period 1990-1998. The quality of a
democracy is de￿ned on the basis of the Gastil Index of Political and Civil Rights produced by
Freedom House. The Gastil Index takes values from 1 to 7, where lower values correspond to better
democracies. Both free and semi-free democracies are included in the data set, which corresponds
to a Gastil Index less or equal to 5.
We focus on two aspects of constitutions, namely the electoral rule and the form of govern-
ment. We apply two measures for the electoral rule, a binary variable, and a continuos one. First,
countries in which the lower house is elected through a plurality rule are classi￿ed as majoritarian
(Majoritarian=1). Therefore, non-majoritarian electoral rules include both mixed and propor-
tional systems. District magnitude constitutes the second, continuos measure of the electoral rule.
District magnitude captures the size of electoral districts in terms of the number of seats assigned
to each district. It takes values between 0 and 1, where 1 represents single-member districts, as in
the UK system, and 0 corresponds to systems characterized by one single national district, as the
Israeli system.
As for the form of government, a country is coded as presidential if the government is not
subject to a vote of con￿dence by the Parliament (Presidential=1). If a vote of con￿dence is
present, the country is de￿ned as parliamentary. The US and Argentina, for example, are labelled
as presidential regimes. France, however, is classi￿ed as a parliamentary regime, given that its
3executive power is subject to the vote of con￿dence from the Parliament.
About 58% of the parliamentary regimes in our sample have a proportional/mixed rule, while
about 67% of presidential regimes have a proportional/mixed rule. This heterogeneity between
forms of government and electoral rules allows to disentangle the distinctive e⁄ects of the two
institutions on voter participation.
The second data source is the Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). The
IDEA database contains information on political participation for national presidential and par-
liamentary elections since 1945. Voter participation is de￿ned as the ratio of votes at national
elections to the voting age population. In presidential regimes, voter turnout is measured as the
average between National Presidential and Parliamentary elections. We focus on the ratio between
the number of votes at national elections and the voting age instead of using the ratio with the
number of registered voters, because registration in itself acts as a form of political participation.
Voter participation varies greatly across the 85 countries considered over the 1990-1998 period,
with an overall average of 67%. Senegal, Guatemala, Colombia, Zambia, Pakistan and Switzerland
have the lowest voting turnout, ranging from 24.19% to 37.67%; while Italy, Uruguay and Malta
register the highest voter turnout rates, between 90.18% and 96.43%2.
Many empirical studies have analyzed the impact of the electoral rule on voter participation:
turnout is usually found to be lower in countries with a plurality rule. Table 1 reports the di⁄erence
in participation between Majoritarian and Proportional/Mixed systems. In line with previous
literature, participation at general elections is about 6% higher in Proportional regimes relative
to Majoritarian ones. But do forms of government have an impact on voter turnout as well? The
lower panel of Table 1 compares voter participation in presidential and parliamentary systems.
Participation in elections is higher in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems and the
di⁄erence is statistically di⁄erent from zero. The average turnout in presidential systems amounts
to 60.3% against a much higher rate of 71.1% in parliamentary systems.
Insert Table 1 here
These stylized facts are the starting point of our analysis: from Table 1 it appears that there
exists a correlation between voter turnout and political institutions. In the next section and the
following one, we will provide evidence that constitutions do shape voter turnout.
3 Do constitutions shape voter turnout?
3.1 Constitutions and voter turnout: OLS analysis
The focus of this section is to address two main issues: ￿rstly, to analyze the relationship between
constitutions and voter turnout and, secondly, to identify the exogenous instruments for electoral
participation required to assess its impact on economic policies. Our dependent variable, therefore,
is voter participation at national elections.
We focus on two sets of determinants: constitutional variables, as expressed by the form of
government and the electoral rule (Presidential, Majoritarian) and socioeconomic variables.
Turnouti=￿0 + ￿1majoritariani + ￿2presidentiali + ￿Xi + "i (1)
2See Table A1.
4where majoritariani is the dummy measuring the electoral rule, presidentiali is the binary
variable measuring the form of government, and Xi represents the vector of controls. We are
mainly interested in the e⁄ects of constitutions on electoral participation, i.e. in the sign and the
statistical signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients ￿1 and ￿2.
Constitutions and electoral laws might regulate voting, in some cases by introducing sanctions
for those who abstain. We consider two variables measuring electoral voting laws: compulsory
voting laws and a measure of the easiness of electoral registration. Among others, Powell (1982),
Jackman (1987) and Blais (2000) show that voting laws are indeed e⁄ective in inducing higher voter
participation. We include a dummy variable, compulsory voting, which takes value 1 in presence
of compulsory voting laws and 0 otherwise. We also measure the extent to which the state takes
up the responsibility for voter registration. We create a dummy variable, voter registration, which
takes value 1 if voter registration is not compulsory and it solely relies on the initiative of voters,
and 0 otherwise. Finally, we consider a further measure of constitutions: the distance between
voters and candidates in national elections. To this end, we include the percentage of legislators
elected in national districts rather than in subnational districts. Our prior is that the higher
the share of candidates elected at national districts, the higher the distance between voters and
candidates, and therefore the lower the electoral participation.
Education is a key variable in explaining voter turnout at a micro level. Wol￿nger and Rosen-
stone (1980) and Blais (2000) empirically show that the propensity to vote does increase substan-
tially with education. Therefore, we insert the country￿ s education level measured by the total
enrollment in primary and secondary education as a percentage of the relevant age group in the
population.
The log of total population is included in order to proxy the weight of one single vote whereby
the larger the population the lower the weight. In addition, we control for the presence of a federal
structure, real GDP per capita, the Gini index of income distribution, whether the country is
an OECD member and the quality of democracy (Gastil Index). Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)
provide evidence that participation in social activities is lower in more racially or ethnically frag-
mented communities. To this end, we control for the degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization of
the country as well. The index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Avelf ) takes values between
0 (homogeneous) and 1 (strongly fractionalized). Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu (2005) among others, show that colonial history is relevant for
the institutional setup of a country. Therefore, we control for geographical variables (Latin Amer-
ica, Asia, Africa) and colonial variables (English colonies, Spanish-Portuguese colonies and other
colonies).
The underlying assumption of this section is that institutions and voter turnout are conditional
mean independent. Under this assumption, the OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent for eq.(1).
We will relax this assumption, allowing for an Heckman correction and an instrumental variable
analysis in the next section.
Insert Table 2 here
Column 1 in Table 2 shows the baseline speci￿cation where voter turnout is regressed on the
constitutional variables and the set of socio-economic variables.
The electoral rule does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect participation rates, although the sign of the
estimated coe¢ cient on the electoral system is as expected. Presidential regimes negatively a⁄ect
voter turnout rates at the 5% signi￿cance level. The form of government seems to negatively
shape voter turnout: electoral participation in presidential regimes is 10.8% lower than electoral
participation in parliamentary regimes.
5Compulsory voting laws are found not to have a statistically signi￿cant impact on voter turnout.
This might be due to the fact that compulsory voting laws might not be actually enforced. In line
with our prior, the distance between candidates and voters has a negative impact on voter partic-
ipation: the higher the share of legislators elected at national districts rather than at subnational
districts the lower the turnout rate.
As expected, the higher the education level, the higher the voter turnout. The coe¢ cient on the
quality of democracy (Gastil Index) is not statistically signi￿cant but it has the expected negative
sign: lower values of the Gastil Index are associated to better democracies. Real per capita
GDP does not a⁄ect voter turnout signi￿cantly. When analyzed at a micro level, participation
and income are usually found to be positively correlated. However, in cross-country studies such
relationship becomes less clear, as noted by Mueller and Stratmann (2003).
The conclusion we draw from this baseline analysis is that, after controlling for socio-economic
variables, forms of government a⁄ect voter participation. On the other hand, the electoral rule as
de￿ned by the dummy variable majoritarian has no role in explaining turnout in contrast with our
prior. However, as we show later, this result is very likely to be driven by the way this dummy is
de￿ned.
In the second column, we add geographical variables (Latin America, Asia, Africa) and colonial
variables (English colonies, Spanish-Portuguese colonies and other colonies) to the speci￿cation.
Presidential regimes and the distance between voters and candidates are still associated with lower
electoral participation, while majoritarian rules have no impact on turnout. Besides, countries
which are more ethnolinguistically homogenous, i.e. those having a lower Avelf index, are associ-
ated to higher voter turnout: as pointed out by Blais (2000), voting acts as a way of "expressing
one￿ s sense of belonging to the larger community" (p. 52).
In the third column, we insert the registration variable as an alternative measure of voting
laws. The registration dummy assesses the extent to which the state takes up the responsibility
for voter registration. It takes value 1 if voter registration is not compulsory and it solely relies
on the initiative of voters, and 0 otherwise. This variable capture the incentive of voters to
register (whether registration is compulsory or not) and the level of di¢ culty of registering, i.e.
whether voters have to explicitly register or whether the voter registers are directly compiled by
the government. We expect that this voting law should have a negative impact on voter turnout.
The third column indeed shows that it is indeed the case. Voter registration has a negative and
signi￿cant impact on voter turnout. All the other results hold, even when we control for colonies
and continents (column 4).
In column 5 and 6 we investigate the role of electoral rules in in￿ uencing voter turnout by
adopting the continuous measure of district magnitude, magnitude, instead of the binary variable
majoritarian. The new result regards indeed the electoral rule, which is now relatively e⁄ective in
in￿ uencing participation once we control for continents and colonies (column 6): the higher the
number of seats in the district, the higher the voter participation. This result is in line with the
political science literature, as proportional systems are highly correlated with district magnitude.
On the other hand, presidential regimes still negatively a⁄ect voter turnout at 1% level, while the
estimated coe¢ cient of voter registration is statistically signi￿cant at 5%.
3.2 Constitutions and voter turnout: instrumental variable analysis
Next, we generalize the link between voter turnout and constitutional variables, by relaxing the
conditional mean independence assumption and allowing institutional variables to be endogenously
determined. Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) propose as instruments for constitutional variables
6the following set of variables: the date of origin of the current constitution, the age of the democ-
racy, the distance from the equator, and the fraction of the population speaking English or any
other European language. The authors argue that younger democracies and more recent constitu-
tions are more likely to be presidential regimes. Also, English speaking countries are more likely to
have a majoritarian electoral rules and a parliamentary system, while distance from the equator is
negatively correlated with parliamentary regimes. Acemoglu (2005) points out a few shortcomings
in the use of this set of instruments for constitutions. In particular, some concerns arise regarding
the validity of the distance from the equator variable and the fraction of the population speaking
English or any other European language. These variable should capture the penetration of Eu-
ropean conquerors (Hall and Jones, 1999) and their impact in shaping the quality of institutions
rather than the type of institutions. We deal with this critique by introducing a new instrument to
the existing set of Persson and Tabellini￿ s instruments3. We create a dummy variable taking value
1 if the country has ever been a monarchy and 0 otherwise. For example, the Italian Republic,
which used to be a monarchy until the referendum in 1946, is assigned value 1. We argue that the
likelihood of adopting a parliamentary regime is higher if a country is or has been a monarchy.
Indeed, out of 33 presidential regimes in our sample, only 4 countries have ever been a monarchy.
As the endogenous explanatory variable, Presidential, is binary, we can make use of the dummy
endogenous variable model by Heckman (1978). In column 1 of Table 3, we report the results of the
￿rst stage regression of the two-stages Heckman estimation, where presidential system is treated
as the endogenous variable. In line with our prior, monarchy has a statistically signi￿cant impact
on the form of government. Countries which have ever been a monarchy are less likely to adopt a
presidential form of government. Latitude and the fraction of population speaking English appear
to be positively correlated with parliamentary regimes, while the fraction of population speaking
any other European language has a positive and statistically signi￿cant impact on the likelihood
of having a presidential regime. Column 2 presents the second stage of the Heckman estimation.
The estimated coe¢ cient of presidential regimes is negative and signi￿cant at 1%. Similarly, voter
registration and the distance between voters and candidates reduce electoral participation, whereby
both estimated coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant at 1% level. These results hold also when
we control for colonies and continents (column 3). The right hand side panel of Table 3 presents
the speci￿cation with majoritarian electoral rules as the endogenous variable. However, we ￿nd
no statistically signi￿cant impact of majoritarian systems on voter participation and the estimates
do not di⁄er from the previous speci￿cation, also when we control for continents and colonies.
Insert Table 3 here
The left panel of Table 3 presents the estimates from the instrumental variable analysis. Col-
umn 1 reports the ￿rst stage for the form of government variable. In line with the Heckman
estimation, current and former monarchies are less likely to have a presidential form of govern-
ment. Younger democracies are also correlated with presidential regimes, while Hall and Jones￿ s
instruments are in line with Persson and Tabellini￿ s estimates. The year in which the constitutions
was established is relevant as well. We deal with Acemoglu (2005)￿ s critique by showing the F-test
for the joint signi￿cance of constitutional variables (year in which the constitution was set-up and
age of democracies). These instruments are jointly signi￿cant at 1%. Column 2 presents the ￿rst
stage for the electoral rule. Countries with higher fraction of the population speaking English are
more likely to have a majoritarian rule, following the in￿ uence of British colonization. Column
3Table A2 in the Appendix shows the estimates using the set of Persson and Tabellini￿ s (2005) instruments.
73 presents the second stage: parliamentary regimes are more likely to be associated with higher
voter participation, while proportional/mixed rules are correlated with higher electoral partici-
pation. Voter registration and distance between candidates and voters have still a negative and
statistically signi￿cant impact on voter turnout. The same results hold also when we control for
colonies and continents. The speci￿cation in the right hand side panel of the table includes all the
covariates and the geographical and colonial history variables. Presidential regimes still negatively
a⁄ect voter turnout and the estimated coe¢ cient is higher than the OLS estimate. All the other
covariates maintain their signi￿cance as in previous columns.
These results shed light on what we consider the ￿rst relationship between constitutions and
voter turnout. The e⁄ect of forms of government on voter turnout is robust even when we relax
the conditional mean independence and we instrument constitutions.
This shows that presidential regimes do induce less turnout. The impact of the electoral formula
as described by the bivariate variable majoritarian is somehow less strong than that of the form of
government. Having proved the ￿rst link, we now turn to the second one in order to understand
the impact of voter turnout on economic policies.
4 Voter Turnout and Policy Outcomes
A ￿rst attempt to study the relationship between voter turnout and economic policies has been
done by Mueller and Stratmann (2003). Their conclusions support our argument that electoral
participation induces larger government size. Unlike Mueller and Stratmann, we are not solely
interested in showing the impact of voter turnout on di⁄erent measures of policy outcomes. Our
idea grounds on the relation between participation and constitutions. To this end, it is crucial to
study the relationship between constitutional variables and voter participation in a⁄ecting ￿scal
policies.
We investigate whether turnout can account, inter alia, for government expenditure, welfare
state, and government budget surplus. In this section, we present the results obtained from using
the cross-country data set.
Persson and Tabellini empirically show the e⁄ects of political institutions on economic policy.
Majoritarian elections and presidential systems are found to negatively and signi￿cantly in￿ uence
total government spending. We depart from their analysis to show that voter turnout is actually
the channel through which presidential regimes a⁄ect policy outcomes.
Participation is treated as endogenous. It is indeed very likely that, in countries with more
generous economic policies, citizens are more willing to turn out in order to keep their status quo.
Again, good instruments must be found. Most of the determinants of voter turnout are endogenous
to policy outcomes and they cannot be used as valid instruments. On the basis of the analysis
conducted in Section 4, we concentrate on a set of three instruments.
Voter registration can be con￿dently used as instrument as there is wide agreement on their
e⁄ectiveness in stimulating voter turnout.
The share of legislators elected at national district level rather than subnational electoral district
does have an impact on electoral participation, as the more distant candidates and voters are, the
lower participation.
Finally, the presidential dummy is included as exogenous instrument4. Table 4 reports the
4Table A3 in the Appendix shows that the impact of the form of government on policy outcomes is not signi￿cant
once we control for voter turnout instrumented by the remaining two instruments. We conclude that the form of
8estimation results.
Insert Table 4 here
The ￿rst stage consists of regressing participation rates on the voter registration, the presi-
dential regime dummy and the share of legislators elected at national districts, together with all
the other expenditure determinants. In the second stage, we regress ￿scal policies on the ￿tted
participation variable and on the set of control variables. The variables which we control for are:
electoral rule, per capita income, trade, log of population, age of democracy, quality of democracy,
colonial history, dummy variables for federal countries, OECD countries and continents, and two
demographic variables measuring the age proportion of the population.
We ￿rst regress central government spending as a percentage of GDP on the electoral rule and
voter turnout. Participation positively a⁄ects total government expenditure at 1% signi￿cance
level. A higher participation rate has led to an increase in the size of governments in the 1990s.
In column 2, we consider another measure of government size. The dependent variable is central
government revenues as percentage of GDP. Turnout does a⁄ect revenues as well and its impact
is positive and signi￿cant at 5% level.
Next, we investigate the role of voter turnout in explaining central government spending on
social services and welfare as a percentage of GDP. The estimated coe¢ cient is positive, as ex-
pected, and it is signi￿cant at 5% level. This result is remarkable as it supports the idea that a
higher turnout rate means a larger participation of the lower end of the income distribution, hence
a larger representation of people who are more likely to bene￿t from more redistributive policies
(Lijphart, 1997).
Interestingly, the introduction of voter participation reduces both quantitatively and qualita-
tively the impact of the electoral rule in in￿ uencing the size of government and welfare state, with
respect to the ￿ndings by Persson and Tabellini.
Finally, we consider government surplus as the dependent variable. Keeping a speci￿cation
similar to the ones implemented before, we regress budget surplus as a percentage of GDP on
constitutional variables, participation rates and the set of usual controls. The electoral rule seems
to play a major role in explaining budget surplus. Majoritarian systems are associated with higher
budget surplus, while voter turnout has a negative impact on it.
In line with our priors, we conclude that voter turnout a⁄ects government size, measured both
as government expenditure and revenues, and welfare state. These results prove the existence of
the second link, connecting participation to ￿scal variables. Forms of government a⁄ect policy
outcomes through voter turnout.
5 Conclusions
This study shows that citizens￿behavior plays a crucial role in understanding how institutions a⁄ect
policy outcomes. We empirically identify two relationships. The ￿rst links political institutions,
in terms of forms of government and electoral rules, to voter turnout. The second connects voter
turnout and policy outcomes.
We investigate the ￿rst relationship by regressing average voter turnout over the 1990s on
institutional and socioeconomic variables. Presidential regimes are found to induce less electoral
government can be used as a valid instrument for participation.
9participation, once we control for all the other socioeconomic covariates. Further, this ￿nding
holds when we relax the conditional mean independence assumption and we instrument political
institutions.
The second part of this paper is devoted to understand whether and in which direction political
participation a⁄ects policy outcomes. Both the cross-country and panel analysis provide evidence
of the positive and signi￿cant impact of voter turnout on government spending, revenues and
welfare state.
We conclude that the e⁄ect of forms of government on policy outcomes as found by Persson
and Tabellini (2003, 2004) is mediated by voter participation in elections.
10Data Appendix
￿ Voter turnout: Voter turnout rate is de￿ned as the ratio between the number of votes
and the voting age population, which includes all citizens above the legal voting age. It is
rescaled by multiplying it by 10. Voter turnout is calculated at National Presidential and
Parliamentary elections. Source: Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),
<www.idea.int>.
￿ Compulsory Voting laws: dummy variable, equal to 1 if voting has been made compulsory
by law, regardless of the level of enforcement, 0 otherwise. Source: International Institute of
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), <www.idea.int>.
￿ Voter Registration: dummy variable,.equal to 1 if voter registration is not compulsory
and it relies on the initiative of voters, and 0 otherwise. Source: International Institute of
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), <www.idea.int>.
￿ Legislators in National Districts: percentage of legislators elected at national districts
rather than subnational districts. Source: Seddon et al. (2001).
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(33 obs.) (52 obs.)
*** significant at 1%, * significant at 10%
14Table 2
Determinants of Voter Turnout. OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (50 (6)
Voter Turnout
Majoritarian 0.825 -4.099 1.561 -2.285
[4.003] [5.148] [3.833] [4.779]
Presidential -10.875 -14.754 -11.741 -16.125 -12.388 -17.425
[4.871]** [5.716]** [4.559]** [5.300]*** [4.657]** [5.447]***
Compulsory 4.731 5.987
voting [3.407] [4.392]
% Legislators elected -15.683 -22.202 -15.684 -22.038 -15.772 -24.574
in National districts [8.117]* [8.487]** [6.986]** [7.151]*** [6.860]** [6.506]***
Education 0.387 0.275 0.416 0.273 0.397 0.231
[0.173]** [0.198] [0.167]** [0.197] [0.171]** [0.183]
Gini index -0.106 -0.416 0.110 -0.052 0.115 -0.175
[0.231] [0.300] [0.232] [0.295] [0.234] [0.298]
Log[Population] 0.863 1.773 1.077 1.744 1.149 2.206
[1.290] [1.617] [1.230] [1.593] [1.154] [1.465]
Log[Real GDP per capita] -2.009 1.721 -3.078 0.058 -3.386 0.206
[4.124] [5.094] [3.857] [4.498] [3.768] [4.503]
Ethno-linguistic -4.884 -24.351 0.727 -18.195 1.816 -21.657
fractionalization [9.831] [10.972]** [9.140] [11.139] [9.084] [10.723]**
Gastil Index -1.253 -0.515 -1.087 -0.026 -1.430 -0.105
[3.087] [3.237] [3.210] [3.363] [3.104] [3.114]
Federal -6.264 -8.492 -5.398 -6.635 -4.625 -6.048
[4.831] [5.264] [5.202] [5.483] [5.282] [5.091]
Voter registration -11.403 -14.684 -10.153 -12.498
[5.029]** [4.807]*** [5.071]* [5.156]**
District Magnitude -2.570 -10.528
[4.613] [5.529]*
OECD member -6.821 -4.033 -3.468 -2.370 -3.507 -0.599
[7.453] [9.407] [7.041] [9.164] [7.161] [8.569]
Continents and Colonies Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded Included
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.40
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
15Table 3
Determinants of Voter turnout. Two Stage Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Presidential Majoritarian Turnout Presidential Majoritarian Turnout
CON2150 -0.064 -0.161 -0.063 -0.583
[0.118] [0.136] [0.151] [0.196]***
CON5180 -0.254 0.442 -0.075 0.249
[0.119]** [0.241]* [0.098] [0.150]
CON81 -0.017 0.180 0.001 0.128
[0.139] [0.245] [0.129] [0.183]
Monarchy -0.359 -0.016 -0.373 0.067
[0.144]** [0.151] [0.138]** [0.144]
Latitude -1.292 0.245 -0.578 1.217
[0.618]** [0.824] [0.538] [0.745]
Age of Democracy 0.583 -0.165 0.614 0.290
[0.228]** [0.302] [0.234]** [0.229]
ENGFRAC -0.635 1.121 -0.478 0.461
[0.144]*** [0.175]*** [0.201]** [0.205]**
EUFRAC 0.320 -0.354 0.001 0.080
[0.148]** [0.225] [0.149] [0.177]
Voter registration -0.059 -0.001 -9.832 -0.112 -0.075 -13.521
[0.148] [0.156] [4.881]** [0.122] [0.126] [4.551]***
% Legislators elected -0.138 0.015 -15.280 -0.424 -0.087 -22.122





Continents and colonies Excluded Excluded Excluded Included Included Included
F-test on 5.14 2.42 2.83 3.64
constitution variables [0.002] [0.063] [0.038] [0.013]
F-test on all excluded 9.41 10.36 3.14 7.12
instruments [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.000]
Hansen J statistic 3.889 3.849
[0.69175] [0.69716]
Shea Partial R2 –
PRES
0.4556 0.4509
Shea Partial R2 –  MAJ 0.3892 0.5137
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include: Education, Gini Index, Gastil Index,
log(Population), log(Real GDP per capita), Ethno linguistic fractionalization, Federal dummy, OECD member.
F-test on constitutional variables refers to the test that CON2150, CON5180, CON81 and Age of democracy are
equal to zero. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
16Table 4: Policy outcomes and voter turnout: IV estimates
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Central Central Budget Welfare
Government Government Surplus Spending
Spending Revenues
Majoritarian -1.350 -0.093 2.136 -1.102
[2.477] [2.269] (0.851)** (1.167)
Voter Turnout 0.546 0.446 -0.139 0.243
[0.196]*** [0.235]* (0.061)** (0.101)**
F-test on all excluded 3.49 3.06 2.61 2.58
instruments [0.022] [0.036] [0.062] [0.065]
Shea Partial R2 0.1249 0.1265 0.1255 0.1242
Hansen J statistic 0.018 0.339 3.313 0.385
[0.991] [0.844] [0.191] [0.825]
Observations 74 71 68 65
All regressions include log(population), Gastil Index, OECD, Federal, prop65, prop1564, trade,
log(Real GDP per capita), age of democracy. Excluded instruments: voter registration,
presidential regimes, % Legislators elected at national districts. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
17Table A1
Voter Turnout by country.




Argentina 81.02 Malawi 68.16
Australia 82.45 Malaysia 63.33
Austria 75.88 Malta 96.43
Bahamas 68.19 Mauritius 79.77
Bangladesh 63.05 Nicaragua 75.8
Barbados 66.72 Norway 75.69
Belarus 60.28 Pakistan 37.48
Belgium 84.15 Papua N. Guinea 84.9
Belize 67.25 Mexico 59.03
Bolivia 57.28 Namibia 63
Botswana 44.63 Nepal 83.32
Brazil 79.07 Netherlands 72.66
Bulgaria 73.01 New Zealand 80.42
Canada 60.47 Paraguay 49.4
Chile 78.84 Peru 61.82
Colombia 33.83 Philippines 66.93
Costa Rica 81 Poland 53.84
Cyprus 79.72 Portugal 75.97
Czech republic 82.78 Romania 77.5
Denmark 81.76 Russia 62.72
Dominican Republic 48.9 Senegal 24.19
Ecuador 65.94 Singapore 54.18
El Salvador 54.95 Slovak Republic 82.9
Estonia 56.02 South Africa 85.53
Fiji 59.86 South Korea 79.22
Finland 74.82 Spain 79
France 64.47 Sri Lanka 71.32
Gambia 61.55 St. Vincent & G 75.16
Germany 73.6 Sweden 81.36
Ghana 60.15 Switzerland 37.67
Greece 84.75 Taiwan 70.9
Guatemala 31.34 Thailand 62.5
Honduras 65.8 Trinidad & Tobago 68.85
Hungary 68.13 Turkey 79.05
Iceland 87.82 USA 45.23
India 61.81 Uganda 56.67
Ireland 63.05 UK 72.38
Israel 83.7 Ukraine 69.89
Italy 90.18 Uruguay 96.11
Jamaica 46.72 Venezuela 47.04
Japan 61.46 Zambia 34.13
Latvia 60.31 Zimbabwe 39.43
Luxembourg 60.52
18Table A2
Determinants of Voter turnout. Instrumental Variable analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Voter turnout
Majoritarian 0.474 -1.882 -2.382 -6.948 -4.853 -8.931
[3.692] [4.325] [4.915] [5.468] [4.077] [4.167]**
Presidential -14.095 -14.999 -12.464 -16.735 -15.510 -9.312
[5.458]*** [6.999]** [4.099]*** [5.017]*** [7.139]** [9.506]
Voter registration -11.408 -14.998 -9.680 -12.796 -10.228 -12.941
[4.274]*** [4.646]*** [4.525]** [4.672]*** [4.882]** [4.557]***
% Legislators elected -15.460 -22.082 -15.954 -22.317 -15.389 -19.805
in National districts [5.958]*** [6.390]*** [5.924]*** [6.344]*** [6.575]** [6.813]***
Education 0.397 0.277 0.424 0.277 0.379 0.213
[0.135]*** [0.140]** [0.131]*** [0.137]** [0.174]** [0.161]
Gini Index 0.170 -0.065 0.107 -0.063 0.199 -0.091
[0.223] [0.258] [0.202] [0.250] [0.251] [0.252]
Log[Population] 1.238 1.694 0.712 1.465 1.329 2.585
[1.152] [1.371] [1.168] [1.362] [1.141] [1.420]*
Log[Real GDP per
capita]
-2.655 -0.098 -2.823 0.408 -4.268 1.413
[3.584] [3.691] [3.501] [3.598] [3.946] [4.219]
Ethno-linguistic 1.912 -19.103 1.110 -18.216 2.823 -19.965
fractionalization [7.673] [10.399]* [7.440] [9.535]* [8.340] [9.785]**
Gastil Index -1.338 0.053 -0.462 0.521 -1.928 -2.062
[2.507] [2.589] [2.534] [2.589] [2.956] [2.773]
Federal -4.948 -6.776 -5.396 -6.925 -4.088 -9.182
[4.915] [4.901] [4.852] [4.859] [4.813] [5.337]*
OECD member -4.537 -2.305 -3.011 -1.707 -3.083 -3.584
[5.884] [6.765] [5.629] [6.705] [6.646] [8.675]
Continents and
Colonies
Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded Included













Rho 0.30 -0.13 0.37 0.42
Hansen J statistic 5.069 1.469
P-value 0.535 0.917
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63
Excluded instruments: fraction of population speaking English (engfrac), fraction of the population speaking any other
European language (eurfrac), latitude, age of the democracy, date of origin of the current constitution (con81, con5180,
con2150). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
19Table A3: Policy outcomes and voter turnout: IV estimates
Presidential regimes as independent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Central Central Budget Welfare
Government Government Surplus Spending
Spending Revenues
Voter Turnout 0.538 0.338 -0.245 0.298
(0.359) (0.492) (0.085)*** (0.138)**
Presidential -0.153 -2.171 -2.236 1.263
(5.633) (7.405) (1.512) (2.428)
Majoritarian -1.423 -1.080 1.187 -0.564
(3.912) (4.244) (1.353) (1.776)
Hansen J statistic 0.016 0.292 0.735 0.001
P-value [0.890] [0.589] [0.391] [0.976]
Observations 74 71 68 65
All regressions include log(population), Gastil Index, OECD, Federal, prop65, prop1564, trade,
log(Real GDP per capita), age of democracy. Excluded instruments: voter registration, % Legislators
elected at national districts. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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